000			04194cam a2200373 i 4500
001			ocn888555074
003			OCoLC
005			20251028093349.0
008			140822s2015 enkb b 001 0 eng c
035			_a(Sirsi) i9781849044912
040			_aYDXCP _beng _erda _cYDXCP _dBTCTA _dGK8 _dCDX _dUAB _dCHVBK _dGUL _dH9Z _dOCLCF _dRID _dSHH _dVF$
019			_a913090871
020			_a1849044910
020			_a9781849044912
035			_a(OCoLC)888555074 _z(OCoLC)913090871
042			_apcc
043			_af-nr---
050		4	_aHV 6433 .N6 _bC64 2015
049			_aVF$A
100	1		_aComolli, Virginia.
245	1	0	_aBoko Haram : _bNigeria's Islamist insurgency / _cVirginia Comolli.
264		1	_aLondon : _bHurst & Company, _c2015.
300			_avii, 239 pages : _bmaps ; _c23 cm
336			_atext _2rdacontent
337			_aunmediated _2rdamedia
338			_avolume _2rdacarrier
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 175-228) and index.
520	8		_a"Northern and central Nigeria have been engulfed in a violent insurgency campaign waged by Jama'atu Ahlis Sunnah Lidda'awati w'al Jihad, a.k.a. 'Boko Haram', and for a time, its splinter group 'Ansaru'. From its inception an inward-looking, almost parochial, movement, Boko Haram, and even more so Ansaru, have now shown clear signs of regionalisation, expanding their operations across West Africa and forging links with al-Qaeda affiliated groups. Boko Haram's stated aim is to Islamise Africa's most populous country but, like earlier Nigerian Islamist groups, of which there is a long tradition in the Sahel, the discontent prompting young Nigerians and other young West African Muslims to join the insurgency is rooted in more than just religious orthodoxy and cannot be disentangled from their economic, social and and political marginalisation. In spite of talks about dialogue and amnesty for those prepared to renounce violence, the Federal Government's response has been a militarised one, resulting in the largest deployment of the Nigerian armed forces since the end of the Civil War. But what is the real magnitude of the threat? What can foreign partners do to support Abuja? How effective is the current government's strategy in tackling the insurgency? And, more importantly, are the root causes of the insurgency being addressed and the foundations for a durable peace being established?"--Publisher description.
505	0	0	_g1. _tIntroduction -- _tResearch challenges -- _g2. _tIslam in Nigeria: Historical Background -- _tUsman Dan Fodio's Jihad -- _tThe British colonial era -- _tThe path to Sharia -- _tSome reflections on religious identity -- _g3. _tThe Genesis of Radical Groups -- _tSplintering -- _tTransformation -- _tReform (modernisation) -- _tFormation (creation) -- _tDaawa -- _tAhl al-Sunnah wal-Jama'ah, Ja'amutu Tajidmul Islami/Islamic Movement of Nigeria[IMN] -- _tYan Izala -- _tMaitatsine -- _tConclusion -- _g4. _tWhat is Boko Haram? -- _tWhere it all started -- _tThe sect goes underground -- _tThe 2009 turning point -- _tDead or alive? -- _tPost-Yusuf -- _tThe Shakau era-the beginning of the insurgency -- _tSplintering, factionalisation and kidnappings -- _tSuicide attacks -- _tWho are these men? -- _tFunding -- _g5. _tThe Internationalisation of Boko Haram -- _tBorderlands -- _tCameroon -- _tNiger -- _tChad -- _tHuman security implications -- _tA wild card: the Central African Republic (CAR) -- _tChanging al-Qaeda patterns and Boko Haram's position in the broader Islamist environment -- _tThe 2012-13 Malian civil conflict -- _tAl-Shabaab -- _tTactical implications of foreign influence -- _tWill Boko Haram become the next al-Qaeda franchise? -- _g6. _tGovernment Responses -- _tThe military response -- _tA first state of emergency is declared -- _tBetween two emergencies -- _tNegotiations and amnesty -- _tA second state of emergency is put in place -- _tMoving beyond JTF ORO -- _tAllegations of human rights abuses -- _tA softer approach -- _tCOIN vs CT: What strategy? -- _tWestern response -- _tThe United States (US) -- _tThe United Kingdom (UK) -- _tCanada -- _g7. _tConclusions -- _tThe Way Ahead?.
610	2	0	_aBoko Haram.
650		0	_aTerrorism _zNigeria _xPrevention.
994			_aC0 _bVF$
999			_c135588 _d135588